Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Friends by Colker, Ruth
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Friends
RUTH COLKER*
This Article examines the citations of amicus briefs by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor in cases in which she authored the opinion for the Supreme
Court in an effort to learn how amicus briefs might influence judicial
behavior. Consistent with theories proposed in the political science
literature, O'Connor was most likely to cite amicus briefs for specialized
facts. She was also likely to cite briefs filed by the Solicitor General,
prestigious professional associations, and the states. Surprisingly, she was
more likely to cite amicus briefs when she disagreed rather than agreed
with their legal position. Contrary to hypotheses found in the political
science literature, O'Connor never cited briefs authored by the American
Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, or other
organizations associated with highly liberal or conservative political
perspectives. These findings might cause some public interest groups to re-
think their amicus brief strategy in the Supreme Court if O'Connor is
reflective of Supreme Court Justices generally. Nonetheless, O'Connor's
failure to cite certain kinds of amicus briefs does not necessarily mean that
she did not take their views seriously, because she frequently adopted the
position of the Solicitor General despite rarely citing him with approval.
Justice O'Connor portrayed herself in her opinions as only being a
'friend" of moderate organizations, but, privately, one can only speculate
as to what views truly influenced her judicial behavior.
Interest groups and others often participate as amicus curiae in the
United States Supreme Court. Many reasons exist for this participation. They
may want to work with others to create a high quality work product. They
may want the "bragging rights" for having their name appear on a Supreme
Court brief. They may want to help their fundraising efforts by
demonstrating that they have a significant role in policy debates.' Most
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likely, they hope to influence the Court's decisions. How likely is that
possibility?
This Article will focus on the citations of amicus briefs by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor when she authored the opinion for the Court. O'Connor's
citation to amicus briefs is useful to study for two reasons. First, she has
recently retired from the Court, so researchers have a complete set of
opinions to examine ranging from 1981 to 2006. Second, she was often the
"swing" Justice on the Court,2 so it is likely that the authors of amicus briefs
had her in mind as their audience as they sought to persuade the Court to a
particular outcome. Hence, an examination of her opinions in cases in which
amicus curiae filed briefs can lend insight into whether amicus briefs have
much influence on the Court's decisions.
The question of influence is not easy to resolve. The mere fact that a
Justice cites an amicus brief does not necessarily mean that the brief
influenced the Justice.3 The citation could be a political signal to demonstrate
that various views were considered.4 Further, a brief that is not cited might
influence a Justice. 5 Finally, a Justice can cite an amicus brief to deflect its
views rather than rely on its views.6 Despite the subjective challenges of
examining opinions written by O'Connor to determine whether amicus briefs
influenced her analysis, that is the approach of this Article. I have examined
2 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The O'Connor Legacy, TRIAL, Sept. 1, 2005, at
68; Tracy Carbasho, Justice O'Connor Leaves Stellar Legacy Through Distinguished
Service on Supreme Court, 7 LAW J. 6 (2005). See infra note 56 for data on the likelihood
of Justice O'Connor voting with the majority.
3 Amicus briefs were cited in thirty-five percent of the opinions of the Court in cases
in which at least one amicus brief was filed. See Songer & Sheehan, supra note 1, at 340-
41.
4 Joseph Keamey and Thomas Merrill argue that "[c]itation or quotation of a brief in
the official Reports of the United States Supreme Court can lend legitimacy to a group,
and may be used by the group in its publicity efforts to create the impression that it has
'access' to or 'influence' with the Court." See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743,
825 (2000). Hence, some organizations may file amicus briefs to increase their prestige
rather than to influence the Court.
5 For example, the Supreme Court never cited a brief written by Laurence Tribe and
others in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), yet the majority appeared to adopt
arguments from that brief in its opinion. See Brief for Lawrence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely,
Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, & Kathleen M. Sullivan as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), 1995 WL 17008432.
The Tribe brief argued that the state could not "deny selected persons access to the
protection of its laws from a whole category of wrongful conduct." Id. at * 13. The
Supreme Court concluded that a state "cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws." Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
6 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987).
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each of the opinions in constitutional law cases 7 authored by Justice
O'Connor, with particular focus on her citation (or lack of citation) to amicus
briefs in these opinions.8 I have also examined the transcripts of oral
7 Justice O'Connor authored more than 300 opinions during her tenure on the Court,
and it was not possible to engage in a qualitative examination of each of these opinions.
By limiting my focus to opinions in constitutional law cases, I was able to create a more
manageable data set of approximately 100 cases. I also chose constitutional law cases
because they have often received enormous public attention and therefore garnered
considerable amicus activity. It is possible, however, that amicus briefs in constitutional
law cases are less likely to influence the Court than amicus briefs in statutory cases
because constitutional law cases are more ideological in nature, and Justices are
perceived to have an inherent ideological bias which is not open to persuasion. I cannot
prove or disprove that possibility; I can only conclude whether amicus briefs appeared to
influence Justice O'Connor in constitutional law cases.
For one limited purpose, I did consider the relationship between amicus briefs and
Justice O'Connor's position in statutory cases. In Appendix B, I focused on O'Connor's
position in cases decided during the 1997 to 2005 terms with respect to the position taken
by the Solicitor General in amicus filings. For that limited purpose, I looked at both
statutory and constitutional law cases for that time period. I found that O'Connor was less
likely to agree with the Solicitor General in statutory cases than in constitutional law
cases. She disagreed with the Solicitor General in 34 of 123 (27.6%) statutory cases and
in 13 of 73 (17.8%) constitutional law cases. These statistics do not support the
hypothesis that the Solicitor General, as a particularly influential amicus participant, has
more influence on O'Connor in statutory than constitutional law cases because she was
more likely to disagree with the Solicitor General in statutory cases. But these statistics
are certainly not dispositive on the question of whether statutory as compared to
constitutional law amici tended to influence O'Connor. The 1997 to 2005 terms
represented a time when the Solicitor General was appointed by a Republican President.
On an ideological basis, one might expect O'Connor to be predisposed to agree with a
Republican Solicitor General on constitutional law issues. See generally Rebecca E.
Deen, Joseph Ignagni & James Meernik, Individual Justices and the Solicitor General:
The Amicus Curiae Cases, 1953-2000, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 71. They found
that, in general, O'Connor was more likely to agree with the Solicitor General when he
took conservative positions (81.7% congruence) than when he took liberal positions
(63.1% congruence). They also found that she agreed somewhat more with the Solicitor
General under Reagan and George H.W. Bush (75% and 80%, respectively) than under
Clinton (70%). Id. at 73. There does, therefore, appear to be a modest political
component to O'Connor's congruence with the Solicitor General, as well as a broad,
general tendency for her to agree with the Solicitor General.
Other than in Appendix B, I only examined O'Connor's opinions in cases in which
she authored the majority opinion for the Court. I did not examine her concurrences,
where she may have joined the Court's decision but not its opinion. Her concurrences
may better reflect her individual philosophy, whereas her majority opinions may reflect
her consensus-building skills. In further research, it would be interesting to compare her
citation record in cases in which she authored opinions other than the majority opinion.
8 1 have studied all of the constitutional law opinions authored by Justice O'Connor
in which her opinion is the opinion of the Court. In some cases, I had to make a
subjective judgment as to whether a case could be considered a "constitutional law" case.
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arguments in these cases to see if they reflect influence by amici curiae. 9
These opinions can offer insight into the types of briefs and types of
arguments that might have persuaded her to reach a particular conclusion,
although causation rather than correlation is necessarily a matter of
conjecture. 10
Part I of this Article will trace the history of the filing of amicus briefs in
the United States Supreme Court. Part II will describe how Justice O'Connor
cited amicus briefs in her constitutional law decisions. Part III will conclude
that the O'Connor citation pattern supports the specialized facts use of
amicus briefs, and also disputes the view that the ACLU has a visible role as
amicus curiae. Further, it reveals that O'Connor was most likely to cite
amicus briefs with which she disagreed, suggesting that one should be
cautious in using citations as a measure of influence.
This problem was particularly evident in cases involving pre-emption and habeas relief.
If O'Connor engaged in significant constitutional analysis in her opinion, then I put the
case in the constitutional category. Not more than a dozen cases required a subjective
assessment, so whether those cases are characterized as constitutional should not affect
the overall analysis. All the cases studied in the constitutional law category are listed in
Appendix A. I have looked at whether amicus briefs were filed in these cases, how many
amicus briefs were filed on each side, who were the authors of these amicus briefs, and
whether, and how she cited these amicus briefs. To determine whether amicus briefs were
filed in a case, I primarily looked at the results from Westlaw for each case. When it
appeared that the Westlaw list was incomplete, I supplemented it with other sources.
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that my records do not include every amicus brief filed in
every case. The number of amicus briefs listed is only approximate but, hopefully, at
least accurately reflects whether amicus briefs were filed in these cases. My records
should be accurate as to whether O'Connor cited an amicus brief in each of her opinions.
9 1 used the transcripts as found on LEXIS for this purpose because those transcripts
are word-searchable electronically. I used the search term "amic!" to determine if an
amicus curiae was mentioned at oral argument. Because the transcripts do not show
which member of the Court is asking a question, I could not readily focus my search on
remarks by Justice O'Connor. Nonetheless, O'Connor was present at these oral
arguments and would have heard a discussion of amici curiae even if she did not help
focus the discussion on them. It is possible that my search term missed a few instances of
references to amicus curiae in which the Court did not use the word "amicus" or "amici."
I did supplement my electronic research by reading about a dozen additional cases in
which I found no electronic reference to "amicus" or "amici," even though O'Connor
cited amicus briefs in her opinion. I did not find any reference to amicus briefs that were
not found electronically in those oral arguments.
10 1 have chosen to focus on cases in which O'Connor authored the Court's opinion
because those cases offer the best evidence of her reasons for adopting the majority
position. It is also a sufficiently large sample-roughly fifty cases-that can offer us the
opportunity to see patterns of influence. Nonetheless, this is a subjective, qualitative
analysis. I reported some quantitative results in a previous article. See Ruth Colker &
Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the Rehnquist Era,
88 VA. L. REv. 1301, 1333-38 (2002).
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I. THE AMICUS BRIEF AS AN INSTITUTION
The amicus curiae has ancient roots. The practice of an outside lawyer
assisting the court existed in Roman law, throughout medieval England, and,
in a limited manner, within the French legal system." In Roman times, the
amicus curiae was a judicially appointed lawyer who served to advise and
assist the court in the disposition of cases.12 Despite a long history of use of
amicus curiae in the English court system, 13 the United States courts did not
use the amicus curiae until 1823.14 Although amicus curiae initially
participated in United States courts as relatively neutral servants of the courts
through the submission of oral advice or points of law, 15 they became
advocates over time through the use of argumentative briefs. 16
11 See Ernest Angell, The Amicus Curiae: American Development of English
Institutions, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1017, 1017 (1967).
12 See Comment, The Amicus Curiae, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 469,469 n.3 (1960).
13 The amicus curiae first appears in the seventeenth century in England. See Samuel
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694, 695
(1963).
14 Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the
Party Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1243, 1250 (1992). The first
amicus brief was filed in Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), when the
Supreme Court requested the assistance of Henry Clay to determine the application of the
Commerce Clause to a land agreement between Kentucky and Virginia. See Sylvia H.
Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of Florida Courts?, 32
STETSON L. REv. 269, 270 n.3 (2003).
15 Stuart Banner reports that most of the neutral amici who participated in cases
from 1790-1830 were "lawyers who happened to be in the courtroom when a case was
being argued, and who made what appear to have been spontaneous oral suggestions to
the court, typically in order to inform the court of precedents of which the court was
unaware." Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and Their
Friends, 1790-1890,20 CONST. COMMENT. 111, 120 (2003).
16 See id. at 121-22 (arguing that the seemingly neutral role of amicus curiae ended
when amici began to submit written briefs rather than participate through oral advice). In
more recent times, few would argue that amici act in a nonpartisan manner, but some
have suggested that amici play a more neutral role when they bring factual matters to the
Court's attention. See generally STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 151-52 (2d. ed. 1984). Nonetheless, Michael Rustad and
Thomas Koenig argue that even when amicus briefs cite social science literature they do
so in a shoddy manner which the authors describe as "junk social science." They
therefore argue that amicus briefs act as lobbyists even when they appear to use social
science data in support of their arguments. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The
Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C.
L. REv. 91 (1993).
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Amicus curiae participation in the Supreme Court has increased
dramatically in recent years. 17 Whereas amicus brief filings were limited to
10% of the Court's cases as recently as 1920, they now constitute roughly
85% of the Court's docket. 18 Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill found that
there has been an increase of more than 800% in the number of amicus-briefs
filed from 1986-1995 (4907) as compared with the period 1946-1955
(531). 19 Not surprisingly, the Court is also more likely than in the past to cite
amicus briefs. While the number of amicus briefs filed increased eightfold,
the likelihood of the Supreme Court citing an amicus brief merely doubled.20
When Kearney and Merrill examined the likelihood of the Court citing an
amicus brief as a ratio to the number of briefs filed, they nonetheless
concluded that "the rate of citations and quotations per brief is more or less
keeping pace with the increase in filings. ''21
The Supreme Court and commentators have disagreed about the
influence of amicus briefs on judicial decisions. Historically, the Supreme
Court has allowed widespread amicus participation, although some members
of the judiciary have criticized this approach. In 1949, Justice Felix
Frankfurter argued that an "easy-going hospitality" towards amicus briefs
was a mistake because it allows the Court to be "exploited as a soap box or
as advertising medium, or as the target, not of arguments but of mere
assertion that this or that group has this or that interest in a question to be
decided. '22 Frankfurter offered this criticism at a time when amicus briefs
had begun to evolve into partisan efforts rather than a more neutral form of
assistance. For a time, his view was also accepted by Justice Harold
Burton, 23 but ultimately the Court adopted a more generous view of
accepting amicus filings. 24
17 Today, the Court grants approximately 85% of the motions filed for permission to
submit an amicus brief, in contrast to the 1940s and 1950s when the Court routinely
denied such motions. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 763-64.
18 See id. at 744. Amicus briefs were filed in nearly 90% of the cases decided during
the 1995-96 term. See REAGAN WM. SIMPSON & MARY R. VASALY, THE AMICuS BRIEF:
How TO BE A GOOD FRIEND OF THE COURT 8 (2d ed. 2004).
19 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 752.
20 Id. at 757.
21 Id. at 761.
22 Felix Frankfurter, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Oct. 28, 1949, as
quoted in Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme
Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 784 (1990).
23 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 22, at 785 n.4 (quoting Burton memo denying
petition to file amicus curiae brief).
24 Chief Judge Richard Posner shares the negative view about amicus participation,
writing that "[t]he vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and
duplicate the arguments made in the litigants' briefs, in effect merely extending the
[Vol. 68:517
O'CONNOR'S FRIENDS
The rules for filing an amicus brief have become fairly permissive.
Under Supreme Court Rule 37, governmental representatives may file an
amicus brief in any case without seeking permission of the parties or the
Court. 25 Nongovernmental entities may file an amicus brief if they obtain the
consent of all parties or if they receive permission from the Court.26
In 1990, the Supreme Court amended its rule to signal that it finds
amicus briefs to be "of considerable help" when they bring "relevant matter
to the attention of the Court that has not already been brought to its attention
by the parties." 27 But the Court also indicated that an "amicus brief which
does not serve this purpose simply burdens the staff and facilities of the
Court and its filing is not favored."' 28 This commentary by the Court suggests
that it favors briefs by third parties that can bring new information or
arguments to the Court's attention, but does not favor "piling on" filings in
which numerous organizations sign on to a brief to signal a position's
length of the litigants' brief. Such amicus briefs should not be allowed." Ryan v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.)
(denying leave to file an amicus brief). The Third Circuit, by contrast, takes a more
positive view towards the filing of amicus briefs. See Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v.
Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the notion that amici must be
impartial as outmoded, and also rejecting the idea that amici should only be filed on
behalf of unrepresented or underrepresented parties).
25 According to Supreme Court Rule 37.4:
No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is
presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of any
agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court when
submitted by the agency's authorized legal representative; on behalf of a State,
Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession when submitted by its Attorney General;
or on behalf of a city, county, town, or similar entity when submitted by its
authorized law officer.
SUP. CT. R. 37.4.
26 See SUP. CT. R. 37.2-3 (providing procedures for seeking permission to file an
amicus brief if a party or parties have withheld consent).
27 SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (1990).
28 See SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (1990). See Tony Mauro, Courts Gets a Tad Less Friendly to
Amici, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 10-11 (1990) (reporting rule change). In 1997, the
Court modified its amicus brief rule to require the disclosure of certain relationships
between the parties to the case and any person or entity that files an amicus brief. See
SUP. CT. R. 37.6 (1997) (requiring nongovernmental amicus curiae to "identify every
person or entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief ... in the first
footnote on the first page of text"). It is too early to know whether this disclosure rule
may lessen amicus participation because parties do not want to disclose that certain
organizations made a monetary contribution to the preparation of the brief
2007]
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political importance. 29 Justice Breyer has endorsed this view of the
importance of briefs which offer new or technical information when he noted
at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science that amicus participation in cases involving scientific and technical
information can play "an important role in educating the judges on
potentially relevant technical matters. '30
Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that the Court is particularly
receptive to novel arguments found in amicus briefs, with commentators
documenting arguments accepted by the Court that were only found in
amicus briefs.3 1 Although most commentators assume that amicus briefs that
make novel arguments can influence the Court's decisions, 32 there are
skeptics. Phillip Kurland and Dennis Hutchinson contend that most people
are "wasting valuable time" by writing amicus briefs because "they are no
more than a registration of the votes of a constituency on one side or other of
the case, underlining the legislative rather than judicial function of the
Court."'33 In a study of the 1992 term, James Spriggs and Paul Wahlbeck
found that the Court was not more likely to cite an amicus brief because it
made a novel argument not found in other briefs.34
29 The new rule was created after eighty amicus briefs were filed in an abortion case,
and the rule was understood to be discouraging such practice in the future. See ROBERT L.
STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO & KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 378 (7th ed. 1993).
30 Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, JUDICATURE, July-
Aug. 1998, at 26.
31 See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 807, 814
(2004) (providing four examples of amicus briefs shaping a brief in that way). Further,
Collins argues that a larger number of amicus briefs in a case makes it more likely that a
party will have litigation success because of "the greater the number of legal arguments
presented, or alternatively framed, on behalf of that party." Id. at 815. Collins'
hypothesis, however, does not take into account the possibility that Justices may share
Frankfurter's view and resent the "piling on" of amicus briefs. These Justices may be
influenced by particularly well written and novel amicus briefs but resent multiple
submissions on a particular point of view.
32 See, e.g., Bruce J. Ennis, Symposium on Supreme Court Advocacy: Effective
Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 603, 603 (1984).
33 Phillip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Business of the Supreme Court,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 628, 647 (1982).
34 James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information
at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. REs. Q. 365, 374 (1997) ("[W]e find virtually no support
for the proposition that the Court is more likely to utilize information contained in amicus
briefs whose sole function is to make arguments not found in party briefs."). The Spriggs
and Wahlbeck study has two limitations. First, they examined all the cases from a
particular term, including those decided by lopsided margins. It would be interesting to
know if amicus briefs have more influence when they are written to influence the
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Gregory Caldeira and John Wright argue that organizations, themselves,
seem to believe that amicus participation can affect judicial behavior.35
When multiple persons or organizations share a particular perspective on a
case, they observe that two approaches are possible. The individuals could
join one common brief (with multiple signatories) or write more than one
brief. Writing more than one brief is the more expensive option.36
Nonetheless, Caldeira and Wright found that organizations with a shared
political perspective are more likely to file multiple briefs than sign a joint
brief. They concluded that "the filing by groups of separate and numerous
briefs strongly indicates that those who run organizations believe that
multiple briefs make a difference. ' 37 If organizations thought that their
participation was merely a political signal then they might be more likely to
employ multiple signings of individual briefs rather than file multiple briefs.
Paul Collins has explored the phenomenon of increased signatories to
individual amicus briefs in the Supreme Court. He documented what he calls
an "interest group participation explosion," whereby the increase in the
number of participants on briefs was almost four times greater than the
number of briefs filed.38 He found anecdotal support for the suggestion that
increasing the number of signatories, rather than the number of briefs, may
influence the Court by signaling an intensity of public opinion.39 "[T]he
affected groups hypothesis holds that it is not the social, scientific, legal, or
political arguments briefs contain that influence the Court, but instead the
"swing" Justices on the Court in close cases. Their data cannot answer that question
because the Court's vote was not one of the factors in their statistical analysis. Second,
the authors put amicus briefs in categories based on whether they only make. novel
arguments and do not give an amicus brief credit for helping to persuade the Court with a
novel argument if it also made an argument located in the party briefs. However, it
should not be surprising that persuasive briefs might make a combination of novel and
repetitive arguments. In fact, the combination might make the briefs appear more
conventional and thereby more persuasive. Their research does show, in fact, that briefs
which both add new arguments and reiterate the party's arguments are more likely to be
incorporated into the majority opinion than briefs which only add new arguments. See id.
at 379-80.
35 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 22.
36 Caldeira & Wright estimate that the filing of a brief costs around $10,000 to
$15,000, in part because the Court insists that the briefs be printed. Caldeira & Wright,
supra note 22, at 800 & 785 n.5. Today, the cost of an amicus brief is probably closer to
$50,000. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33, 58 (2004).
37 Caldeira & Wright, supra note 22, at 800.
38 Collins, supra note 3 1, at 811.
39 Collins provides several arguable examples of that kind of influence where
Justices mentioned each amicus to a brief by name, suggesting they were aware of the
number of participants on a brief. Id. at 815.
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mere presence of a large number of interests on one side of the dispute
relative to the other." 40
From an empirical perspective, Collins was able to document that
increasing the number of briefs had a modest, positive effect on judicial
behavior.4 1 Examining the time period between 1953 and 1985 (before
Rehnquist became Chief Justice), he found that the petitioner's probability of
success increased when three briefs instead of one were filed on behalf of the
petitioner, but that the probability of success actually declined modestly
when the number of amicus filings was as high as twelve. Collins interpreted
this finding to mean that "as the number of amicus briefs increases, these
briefs are likely to reiterate the arguments of the supported litigant and/or of
the fellow amici, and the Court seemingly takes notice of such reiteration. 42
Collins' interpretation, however, does not explain why the likelihood of
success would actually decline. An alternative explanation is that the filings
start looking like political "pilings on," which undermines their effectiveness
to those members of the Court who are particularly hesitant to appear to be
influenced by public opinion.
Kearney and Merrill have examined a somewhat more recent time
period-extending to 1995-and confirmed that "piling on" can be
ineffective. They found "no evidence to support the proposition that large
disparities of amicus support for one side relative to the other result in a
greater likelihood of success for the supported party. '43 Interestingly, one
side appears to benefit if there is a small disparity between the number of
briefs filed on each side, but when the disparity reaches three or more briefs
there is no apparent benefit.44
Kearney and Merrill found that the most important indicator of amici
influence was whether the brief was filed by "institutional litigants and by
experienced lawyers."'45  Other commentators have suggested that
experienced litigants such as the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement, and, particularly, the Solicitor General have
an effect on the Court's decisions.46
40 Id. at 814.
4 1 Id. at 822.
4 2 Id. at 825.
43 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 750.
44 Id. at 795-96.
45 Id. at 750.
46 See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae
Participation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 LAw & POL'Y 161, 168-70
(1987) (noting that briefs for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement were particularly
successful in the criminal context); Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus Curiae Briefs by the
Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts: A Research Note, 41 W. POL.
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Although it is well established that the Solicitor General as an
institutional actor earns enormous respect from the Supreme Court, the
Court's rules, themselves, also suggest that amicus briefs by all branches of
government are particularly welcome. Whereas nongovernmental entities
must seek the parties' permission to file an amicus brief, the Solicitor
General, as well as state and local government officials, do not need
permission from the parties to file an amicus brief.47 That rule has been in
place for more than fifty years and may reflect a signal that the Court is
particularly interested in learning about the impact of its decisions on the
other branches of government, both at the federal and state level.
Commentators generally support the view that amicus briefs have a
positive influence on the Court, particularly when the Solicitor General
participates as an amicus. But most of the analysis is merely correlational-
thatthe presence of an amicus brief correlates with the party prevailing who
the amicus supports. Few, if any, of the existing studies include a research
methodology in which the investigator actually read the Court's citation to
the amicus brief to see if there is qualitative support for the notion that the
amicus brief influenced the Court's decision.48 Collins himself recognized
Q. 135 (1988) (tracing positive impact of briefs by Solicitor General on the merits);
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 760, 805 (documenting increase in citation of
Solicitor General in each decade of study; showing some favorable results when ACLU
appears as amicus). Cf Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for
Deference?: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131, 137-38
(2004) (finding mixed results on whether the Solicitor General as amicus influences
judicial behavior by certain members of the Rehnquist Court).
47 See SuP. CT. R. 37.4.
48 Of course, it is also possible that amicus briefs influence the Court's decision yet
are not cited in the Court's opinion. Kelly Lynch argues that citation frequency studies
therefore potentially underestimate the impact of amicus briefs. She suggests that
interviews with former Supreme Court clerks could provide more accurate information
about the impact of amicus briefs on the Court's decisions. See Kelly J. Lynch, Best
Friends?: Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL.
33, 38 (2004). Based on her interviews, she concluded: (1) that amicus briefs were most
useful when they involve highly technical and specialized areas of law, (2) that amicus
briefs were more likely to be read when fewer were filed, (3) that the Solicitor General's
brief was always considered more seriously than other amicus briefs, but that greater
weight was also given to the briefs of certain entities such as the ACLU, NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, the American Medical Association, and other professional organizations,
and (4) that the briefs by prominent academics or reputed attorneys were often given
more attention. Id. at 41-56.
In a relatively small qualitative study of amicus briefs, Andrew Morriss concluded
that they "exert relatively little obvious influence on the Court." Morriss, supra note 1, at
826. Morriss, however, only examined four employment discrimination cases during the
1997-1998 term, a small sample from which to draw conclusions. Nonetheless, he was
very critical of the quality of these briefs because he viewed them as engaging in
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the value of qualitative studies of a more recent era of Supreme Court
decisions.49
If one uses qualitative tools to assess impact, one still needs an
explanation of how amici filings might influence judicial behavior so that
hypotheses can be tested. Kearney and Merrill have posited three ways that
amicus briefs might influence judicial behavior. First, briefs that are of high
quality and "provide new, legally relevant information to the Court beyond
that supplied by the parties" might influence judicial behavior if one
considers Justices to be neutral arbiters searching for the most appropriate
legal principles. 50 Under that model, one would expect a Justice to cite an
amicus brief for a proposition not found in the main brief. Spriggs and
Wahlbeck used quantitative tools to conclude that amicus briefs did not have
that kind of influence during the 1992 term,51 but researchers have not
examined that hypothesis using qualitative tools for a particular Justice in
close cases.
Second, amicus briefs by the Solicitor General or other institutional
actors such as the states might influence judicial behavior if one believes that
Justices adjust their decisions based on their perception of how other
institutional actors are likely to respond to their decisions.52 As mentioned
above, 53 the Court's permissive rules with respect to filings by governmental
actors suggest that the Court values amicus briefs by governmental entities.
Qualitatively, to confirm or reject this hypothesis one should look for
lobbying activity rather than high quality legal arguments. He concluded: "[A]mici briefs
will continue to pour into courts as various interest groups seek to lobby courts to gain
what they cannot or choose not to seek from the political branches. Such lobbying
impoverishes legal discourse and, thus, impoverishes us all." Id. at 911.
49 He concludes with this observation:
An additional limitation of this analysis is the fact that it only examines amicus
activity during the Warren and Burger courts. It is possible that the recent and
dramatic increases in amicus filings in the Supreme Court have resulted in a
'routinization' of how amicus briefs are considered by the Court. In other words, the
fact that amicus participation is now present in almost every case heard by the Court
may have changed how these briefs are taken into account. Undoubtedly, this is an
area ripe for examination, and is likely to be a subject of both theoretical and
empirical interest to scholars of both interest groups and the judiciary. Thus, a
resurgence of quality scholarship on amicus participation may be of benefit to
scholars of both the judiciary and interest groups, and will likely lead us toward a
better understanding of the motivations and impact of friends of the court.
Collins, supra note 31, at 829.
50 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 778.
51 See Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 34.
52 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 4, at 778-79.
53 See supra notes 25-26.
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evidence that the citation to an amicus brief reflected sensitivities to the
politics of other institutional actors.
Third, amicus briefs that reflect broad public opinion might influence
judicial behavior if one believes that Justices decide cases in accordance with
the desires of the organized groups that have an interest in the controversy. 54
One could find support for this hypothesis if a Justice was more likely to cite
well-respected rather than fringe organizations, because the well-respected
organization might be considered a more centrist representative of the
electorate.
These issues are some of the factors that I considered as I reviewed
Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court. By reading the majority opinions
closely in constitutional law cases in which she cited amicus briefs, I tried to
discern: (1) whether her relatively frequent citations to the Solicitor
General's briefs signal that his views influenced her decision, (2) whether she
tended to cite briefs for novel legal arguments, (3) whether certain types of
organizations were more likely to be cited, (4) whether briefs that were cited
for specialized facts appeared to influence her decision, and (5) whether her
citation of amicus briefs indicated respect or independence rather than
influence.
11 This Article is limited to an investigation of the citation pattern of Justice
O'Connor and might not generalize to other Justices. Nonetheless, it can
provide us with a good snapshot of one of the most influential Justices of the
last decade and, in particular, possibly give insight into the role of the "swing
Justice" on the Supreme Court when that Justice authors the majority opinion
of the Court.
II. CITATIONS TO AMIcus BRIEFS
A. Introduction
There were 106 cases in the constitutional law category in which Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court and at least one amicus brief was
filed. 55 Although causation is always difficult to prove, it would appear that
some amicus briefs in constitutional law cases have had an influence on
Justice O'Connor consistent with the intentions of the authors of those briefs,
who most likely viewed O'Connor as an important "swing vote. ' '56 The most
54 Keamey & Merrill, supra note 4, at 786. Under this model, judges do not have
fixed beliefs. Instead, they seek "to satisfy the political demands of the best-organized
groups appearing before them." Id. at 783.
55 See Appendix A.
56 The Harvard Law Review reports statistics for the Justices each term. These
statistics reflect that Justice O'Connor was more likely to vote with the majority than any
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notable example is Grutter v. Bollinger,57 in which nearly 100 briefs were
filed.58 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, citing eight
amicus briefs to support arguments in her opinion. Her use of those briefs
supports both the specialized facts and public support theories for amicus
citations.
First, she cited the brief for- Judith Areen et al. and the brief for Amherst
College et al. to make the reliance argument that "[p]ublic and private
universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions programs
on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-conscious policies. '59 This
reliance-based argument is similar to an argument she accepted in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey6 °: that women had come to rely on the availability of
abortion since Roe v. Wade.61 It would have been difficult for the respondent
in Grutter to have made that argument without the support of public and
private universities across the country; the amicus briefs served that purpose.
Second, O'Connor cited five amicus briefs in support of the conclusion
that the Michigan Law School had a compelling interest in diversity. She
cited the brief by the American Educational Research Association et al: for
the proposition that "numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly
other member of the Court. For example, in the 2003 term, Justice O'Connor voted with
the majority in 45 of 53 (84.9%) non-unanimous cases, and she agreed with the
disposition of the case in 48 of 53 (90.6%) non-unanimous cases. See 118 HARV. L. REv.
497, 502 Table I(D) (2004). Those were the highest percentages on the Court. The
statistics from the 2003 term reflect her pattern throughout her tenure on the Court as
reported in the Harvard Law Review for the previous six terms. See The Statistics, 117
HARv. L. REv. 480, 484 Table I(D) (2003) (83.0% joining Court's opinion; 87.2%
agreeing in the disposition of the case); 116 HARv. L. REv. 453, 457 Table I(D) (2002)
(74.5% joining Court's opinion; 80.4% agreeing in the disposition of the case); 115
HARv. L. REV. 539, 543 Table I(D) (2001) (81.8% joining Court's opinion; 83.6%
agreeing in the disposition of the case); 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 394 Table I(D) (2000)
(84.0% joining Court's opinion; 92.0% agreeing in the disposition of the case); 113
HARv. L. REV. 400, 404 Table I(D) (1999) (82.1% joining Court's opinion; 85.7%
agreeing in the disposition of the case); 112 HARv. L. REv. 366, 370 Table I(D) (1998)
(75.0% joining Court's opinion; 78.8% agreeing in the disposition of the case). Prior to
the 1997 term, the Harvard Law Review does not provide this data for individual Justices.
Other than the 1997 term, in which Rehnquist and Kennedy had higher rates of voting
with the majority (81.1% and 84.9% respectively), O'Connor was consistently the Justice
most likely to vote with the majority.
57 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
58 See Appendix A.
59 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
60 505 U.S. 833, 854-56 (1992).
61 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals." 62
She then turned to three briefs from the private and public work sector to
conclude that these theoretical arguments are "real."'63 In particular, she
appears to have been influenced by the brief from "high-ranking retired
officers and civilian leaders of the United States military," citing and quoting
from their brief for an entire paragraph.64 She completed her discussion of
the law school's compelling interests by citing the brief for the United States
as well as the Brief for the Association of American Law Schools. 65
The citation to the brief authored by the Solicitor General is not
surprising; most commentators agree that the Solicitor General is often
particularly influential during Supreme Court argument.66 In Grutter,
however, the Solicitor General supported the petitioner, Barbara Grutter,
whose position O'Connor rejected. O'Connor cited the Solicitor General's
brief twice. First, she cited it in support of her compelling interest analysis,
noting that the United States agreed that it was of "paramount" importance to
ensure "that public institutions are open and available to all segments of
American society."'67 Second, she cited the Solicitor General's brief to
recognize a race-neutral alternative suggested by the United States.68 But she
then rejected that race-neutral alternative because the "United States does
iot, however, explain how such plans could work for graduate and
professional schools."69 Although the Solicitor General took an overall
position contrary to that of O'Connor, she used his brief strategically to
support part of her argument and rejected other aspects of his brief which did
not support her conclusion. The Solicitor General's brief did not influence
O'Connor's opinion in the direction desired by the Solicitor General; instead,
the citation reflected her respect for his position.
The brief by the military officers, by contrast, does appear to have
influenced O'Connor's position. O'Connor portrayed their position in
positive terms for a paragraph of her opinion. In addition, the military amicus
brief played a central role during the oral argument when Justice Ginsburg
brought it to the attention of petitioner's counsel.70 After Ginsburg's mention
62 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (quoting Brief for American Educational Research
Association et al. as Amici Curiae).63 Id. at 330-31.
64 Id. at 331 (citing and quoting from Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici
Curiae).65 Id. at 331-32.
66 See supra note 46.
67 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32.
68 Id. at 340.
69 Id.
70 Justice Ginsburg posed the following question to petitioner:
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of the amicus brief, the Solicitor General responded to the arguments made in
the military brief during his oral argument. 71 Valuable oral argument time
was therefore devoted to the views expressed in the military amicus brief.
Ginsburg may have mentioned the military brief strategically during oral
argument in order to increase the chance that it would be considered
seriously by O'Connor. The extensive citation in O'Connor's opinion
suggests that Ginsburg's strategy may have been successful and that the brief
did play an influential role in O'Connor's judicial behavior.
It is also interesting to consider what briefs O'Connor did not cite in her
opinion. Sixty-nine amicus briefs were filed in Grutter in support of the
University of Michigan. 72 Fifteen briefs were filed in support of Barbara
Grutter. 73 O'Connor cited nine of these briefs. She did not cite any briefs that
explicitly mentioned race, gender, religion, or national origin in the name of
the organization represented by the brief. Instead, she cited briefs on behalf
of more neutral-sounding organizations. Although most commentators
recognize that amicus briefs have increasingly taken on the role of advocate,
and certainly each of these briefs can be described as engaging in advocacy,
O'Connor cited them for real world facts rather than political or legal
arguments. These factual arguments, however, could have been found in
briefs written on behalf of organizations that name themselves in explicit
racial terms, like the Black Law School Graduates Committee, the Black
Women Lawyers' Association of Greater Chicago, Michigan Black Law
Mr. Kolbo, may I call your attention in that regard to the brief that was filed on
behalf of some retired military officers who said that to have an officer corps that
includes minority members in any number, there is no way to do it other than to give
not an overriding preference, but a plus for race.... What is your answer to the
argument made in that brief that there simply is no other way to have Armed Forces
in which minorities will be represented not only largely among the enlisted
members, but also among the officer cadre?
Transcripts of Oral Argument at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241). Following Justice Ginsburg's question, other Justices further pursued this line of
inquiry. Discussion of this issue lasts five of the eighteen pages of Mr. Kolbo's
argument-more than one-fourth of his oral argument. Id. at 7-11. The Solicitor General
also engaged in oral argument. In the first question from the Court, Justice Stevens asked
him to comment on the strength of the retired military officers' brief. Justice Ginsburg
then asked him an additional question about the military's position on affirmative action.
Finally, Justice Kennedy asked questions about the military's position. Of the Solicitor's
ten pages of oral argument, four were devoted to discussion of issues raised in the
military amicus brief. Id. at 19-22. Hence, the retired military officer's brief played a
dominant role during the Grutter oral argument.
71 Id. at 19-22.
72 See University of Michigan Admissions Lawsuits,




Alumni Society, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, National
Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America, and the United Negro
College Fund.74 Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, in her concurrence, cited a
brief by the National Urban League,75 which would be considered a less
"neutral" authority than those cited by O'Connor.76 Even the National Urban
League, however, does not use a racial descriptor in its title. "Neutral"
sounding authorities may therefore be more acceptable to many Justices,
including both O'Connor and Ginsburg.
O'Connor's choice of which amicus briefs to cite would not appear to
have been influenced by her consensus-building role in the case. The other
Justices who joined her opinion--Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and Stevens-
are associated with the "liberal" wing of the Court and would likely be
comfortable being associated, for example, with the NAACP LDF. Indeed,
Ginsburg herself cited the National Urban League in her concurrence. Thus, I
conclude that it is O'Connor's temperament, rather than that of her
associates, which caused her to avoid citing any of the "politicized" groups
that filed amicus briefs in this case.
The Grutter case, however, is only one constitutional law decision in
which amicus briefs appeared to play a prominent role and may have
influenced a decision authored by Justice O'Connor. Do other cases reflect
the role that amicus briefs played in that case? Is O'Connor more likely to
cite the Solicitor General to deflect rather than agree with his views? Is she
generally unlikely to cite well-known political groups in briefs?
B. Other Constitutional Law Cases with Amicus References77
Of the 125 constitutional law cases in which O'Connor wrote the opinion
for the Court, she cited an amicus brief in 32 cases. Of these 125 cases,
amicus briefs were filed in 106 of them (84%). Hence, she cited amicus
briefs in 32 of the 106 cases (30.2%) in which amicus briefs were
submitted.78 She was no more likely to cite an amicus brief in a close case
74 Id.
75 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
76 See National Urban League Mission Statement, http://www.nul.org/mission.htmi
.(last visited Mar. 11, 2007) (describing the mission of the National Urban League as
devoted to empowering African Americans to enter the economic and social mainstream).
77 Appendix A describes these cases in greater detail on an individual basis. It
details the Justices who joined O'Connor's opinion, the legal theory at issue, and the
ways in which amicus briefs were cited in the O'Connor opinion. More detail is offered
for cases that cite amicus briefs than other cases.
78 O'Connor's citation of amicus briefs seems pretty typical for a Supreme Court
Justice. One study found that approximately 35% of Supreme Court opinions written
between 1985 and 1995 contained a reference to at least one amicus brief. See Robert W.
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(one vote margin) than in a case decided by a wider margin. Of the 40 cases
in which amicus briefs were filed and that were decided by a one-vote
margin, she cited an amicus brief in 11 cases (27.5%)-roughly her citation
rate to amicus briefs in all cases in which amicus briefs were filed. These
cases can provide insight on the five issues discussed in Part I: (1) influence
of the Solicitor General, (2) citations for novel legal arguments, (3) types of
organizations most likely to be cited, (4) citations for specialized facts, and
(5) use of briefs for purposes other than influence.
1. Influence of Solicitor General
Justice O'Connor cited the Solicitor General's brief in eleven cases, but
she only agreed with the Solicitor General's argument in two of the cases.79
A good example of the way O'Connor cited the Solicitor General's brief can
be found in O'Connor v. Ortega,80 a case involving the constitutionality of a
search and seizure of an employee's desk and file cabinets. In a ruling from
the bench, the district court concluded that the entry into the office was
justified by the "need to secure the office" so that the search was
"reasonable." 81 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a
determination of damages. 82 The case presented two questions: (1) whether a
public employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk,
Bennett, Counter-Conversationalism and the Sense of Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 845,
883-84 (2001). That figure counts a citation by any Justice. Justice O'Connor, alone,
cited amicus briefs in 30% of her opinions for the Court in constitutional law cases.
79 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003) (citing Solicitor General but
rejecting his suggestion); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 546-47 (2001)
(citing Solicitor General but rejecting his view); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S.
344, 354-56 (2000) (citing Solicitor General's conflicting positions and adopting his
view from an earlier case); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 676-79
(1995) (citing but rejecting legal test suggested by Solicitor General); Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1992) (citing Solicitor General and agreeing with his
conclusion); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (citing Solicitor General and
agreeing with his conclusion); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 327 (1988) (only cites
Solicitor General in part of decision in which she disagrees with his argument); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (citing brief of Solicitor General to deflect argument made
by dissent); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987) (citing Solicitor General's
legal argument but adopting a more middle-ground approach); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987) (citing Solicitor General for his legal
position, which she rejects); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (citing
Solicitor General for the legal position he recommended but not adopting his argument).
80 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
81 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at *4,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 780 U.S. 709 (1987) (No. 85-530), 1986 WL 727381 [hereinafter
Brief for the United States].
82 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 764 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1985).
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and file cabinets at his place of work, and (2) the appropriate Fourth
Amendment standard for a search conducted by a public employer if the
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.8 3
The Solicitor General took a more extreme position with respect to the
first issue than was adopted by the district court or the court of appeals.
Solicitor General Charles Fried argued that "A Government Employee Has
No Reasonable Expectation That A Supervisor Or Co-Employee Will Not
Enter His Office In The Course Of Performing Employment-Related
Duties."84 Although the district court had ruled for the state hospital, it did
not conclude that an employee can never have a reasonable expectation of
privacy against a search of his office by his employer. Instead, the district
court found that the need to secure the property as a part of the investigation
of the employee's activities justified the search. The court of appeals also
found that an employee can have a reasonable expectation of privacy and
concluded that the employee had such an expectation under the
circumstances of the case, reversing the district court. Thus, neither court
below had taken the absolutist position of no expectation of privacy argued
by the Solicitor General.
In O'Connor's opinion for the Court, she reversed the court of appeals
with respect to its determination of the second issue but affirmed with respect
to its determination of the first issue. She acknowledged that the Solicitor
General had argued that "public employees can never have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their place of work" but disagreed with that
conclusion. 85
With respect to the second issue, the Solicitor General argued that a
reasonableness, rather than probable cause, standard should apply to
determining whether a search violated the Fourth Amendment. Under a
reasonableness standard, the Solicitor General argued that the Ninth Circuit's
decision should be reversed because the search was clearly reasonable as part
of an investigation of employment-related misconduct. O'Connor did not cite
the Solicitor General in this part of her opinion but did generally adopt the
reasonableness standard articulated by the Solicitor General. Nonetheless,
she did not apply that standard to the facts of the case, instead concluding
that a remand was appropriate to the district court for it to apply the law to
the facts. 86 She therefore did not provide the broad ruling in favor of the state
hospital sought by the Solicitor General on this issue.
The Ortega opinion is reflective of how O'Connor tends to cite the
Solicitor General. She cited the Solicitor General to acknowledge her
83 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 711-12.
84 Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at *8.
85 Ortega, 480 U.S. at 717.
86 Id. at 726, 729.
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disagreement with his position but then failed to cite him when she generally
agreed with his legal argument. In addition, she disagreed when he offered
what may be characterized as an "extreme" view but agreed when he offered
a more moderate position.
This citation pattern reflects three general trends in O'Connor's use of
citations: (1) she cites the Solicitor General as a signal of respect even when
she disagrees with his position, (2) she tends to agree with moderate rather
than extreme positions, and (3) she rarely cites a brief to show she agrees
with its legal argument.
The Solicitor General may be an unusual amicus because of the
expectation that the Court will agree with his position. Although, as I will
discuss below, O'Connor often cited amicus arguments to deflect them. This
pattern is particularly common with respect to the Solicitor General.
Another unusual feature of the Solicitor General is that he is more likely
to file as an amicus than any other entity. Although I have not been able to
investigate the frequency with which the Solicitor General filed amicus briefs
in comparison with the frequency with which he is cited for my entire data
set, I was able to engage in that comparison for 1997 to 2005, when the
Solicitor General made its briefs available electronically on its database. 87
For that time period, the Solicitor General filed amicus briefs in five cases
and was cited in three of those cases in which O'Connor wrote an opinion.88
Because it is hard to generalize from five cases, I looked more broadly at
the Solicitor General's participation in constitutional law and statutory cases
for that time period. Appendix B summarizes my results for cases in which
the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief and Justice O'Connor participated
in the Court's decision for the 1997 through 2005 terms. This category
consists of 196 cases; 123 involved statutory, copyright, or treaty issues, and
73 involved constitutional law issues.
I divided the cases into four categories: (1) those in which the Solicitor
General, O'Connor, and the Court took the same position, (2) those in which
the Solicitor General and the Court took the same position, but O'Connor
dissented, (3) those in which the Solicitor General and O'Connor took the
same position, and O'Connor dissented, and (4) those in which O'Connor
and the Court took the same position, but the Solicitor General disagreed. To
determine the Solicitor General's position, I primarily relied on whether he
characterized his position as being for the respondent or the petitioner. There
were eleven cases in which the Solicitor General did not style his brief as
being on behalf of either party. Nonetheless, the content of the brief was
clearly supportive of one position; hence, I categorized those cases based on
87 See Appendix B.
88 See Appendix B.
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the substantive content of the brief rather than its appearance. 89 This was too
small a subset to warrant special consideration, but it is interesting to note, as
a matter of strategy, that the Solicitor General might occasionally seek to
appear in the role of a neutral amicus rather than as a strong advocate. The
following table summarizes the number of cases in each of these categories:
Positions of O'Connor, Solicitor General, and the Court for 1997-2005:
Statutory Constitutional
Category 1:
O'Connor, SG, and 87 (70.7%) 56 (76.7%)
Court agree
Category 2:
SG & Court agree, 8 (6.5%) 1(1.4%)
O'Connor dissents
Category 3:




Court & O'Connor 26 (21.1%) 12 (16.4%)
agree, SG disagrees
Total 123 73
These statistics reflect that O'Connor was very likely to agree with both
the Solicitor General and the Court in both constitutional law and statutory
cases during this time period.90 However, she was somewhat more likely to
89 Nonetheless, I also put these cases into a fifth category so the reader can see
where I made an individualized assessment rather than relying on the Solicitor General's
own characterization of his position. See Appendix B. Others may want to consider
further why the Solicitor General chooses not to characterize his brief in some cases as
being on behalf of one of the parties.
90 Of course, the cases were filed under a Republican President. Other researchers
have found a similar pattern of agreement by O'Connor with the Solicitor General under
a Republican President but have found a somewhat lower agreement rate during a
Democratic Presidency. See Rebecca E. Deen, Joseph Ignagni & James Meemik,
Individual Justices and the Solicitor General: The Amicus Curiae Cases, 1953-2000, 89
JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 68. O'Connor's overall congruence with the Solicitor
General during the Reagan administration was 75%, 80% during the George H.W. Bush
administration, and 70% during the Clinton administration. Id. at 73. These numbers
suggest that there may be a modest political component to O'Connor's tendency to agree
with the Solicitor General, but the political component appears to be stronger for most of
the other members of the Court. For example, Justice Thomas agreed with the George
H.W. Bush administration in 83% of cases in which the Solicitor General filed as an
amicus curiae but in only 62% of cases under the Clinton administration. See id.
2007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
agree with the Court (categories I and 4) than with the Solicitor General
(categories 1 and 3). Despite the likelihood that O'Connor agreed with the
Solicitor General (more than 80% of cases), she was most likely to cite the
Solicitor General in constitutional law cases to reflect that she disagreed with
his position. Her citations appeared to reflect her deviation from the default
principle-that she agreed with the Solicitor General-so that some
explanation was considered appropriate. Because of the large number of
cases in which the Solicitor General and O'Connor were in agreement, it is
possible that the Solicitor General did sometimes influence her position even
though she rarely cited him in cases in which she authored the majority
opinion.
O'Connor's citations to the Solicitor General's briefs are also unique in
another sense. With respect to other amici, as I will discuss below, O'Connor
tended to cite them only for specialized facts rather than legal theories. With
respect to the Solicitor General, however, O'Connor cited to his legal
arguments. The Solicitor General may therefore have had a higher likelihood
of persuading O'Connor on legal issues because of the greater solicitude that
she paid to his legal arguments. It would appear she considered his
arguments carefully even when she disagreed with him. By extension, she
may have also considered his legal arguments carefully in cases in which she
does not cite him but agrees with his ultimate position.
This close examination of the Solicitor General's role in the Supreme
Court reflects how difficult it is to measure influence. Reference to citations
alone would suggest that O'Connor rarely agreed or was influenced by the
Solicitor General. A broader perspective, in which one examines how
frequently she agreed with a Republican Solicitor General, suggests that the
Solicitor General may frequently have influenced her position. Finally, the
observation that she frequently cited the Solicitor General for his legal
position (even when she disagreed with it) suggests that she treated his legal
position with considerable care and respect. Prior studies that only focused
on quantitative results could not evaluate the ways in which the Solicitor
General was cited or how he may have influenced the Court's decisions.
2. Citation for Novel Legal Arguments
O'Connor's citation record does not support the argument that a Justice
is most likely to be influenced by a brief that asserts a novel legal theory. 91 In
91 The lone exception was Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989), in which
O'Connor discusses the legal issue of retroactivity as urged by the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, devotes a dozen pages to the issue, and then adopts the view of Justice
Harlan. By contrast, O'Connor cited an amicus brief by the Washington Legal
Foundation in another case to indicate that the Court would not consider a novel
argument raised by that brief but not otherwise found in the case. See Davis v. United
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general, as discussed below, O'Connor was most likely to cite briefs in
support of factual rather than legal arguments. Hence, the use of amicus
briefs to support any legal argument was rare, let alone a novel legal
argument.
When the Supreme Court Rules assert that amici briefs are "of
considerable help" when they bring "relevant matter to the attention of the
court that has not already been brought to its attention by the parties," 92 it
appears that the Court is not referring to new legal theories that have not
already been considered in the case. Instead, as suggested by Justice Breyer,
the rules may be simply contemplating new technical or background
information that would be helpful to the Court in its deliberations. 93 It is
contrary to the notion of fair advocacy for amicus briefs to raise new legal
theories at the Supreme Court stage of litigation that were not considered
below.94
3. Organizations Most Likely To Be Cited
O'Connor cited briefs by states in five cases, but only agreed with the
state position in one of those five cases. 95 These citations could reflect
respect for other branches of government but, again, they show little
influence. O'Connor never cited organizations affiliated with extreme
political perspectives, but cited well established organizations like the
American Association on Mental Retardation in eight cases, and usually cited
their briefs for specialized facts even if she disagreed with their conclusion. 96
States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1993). Similarly, in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488,
497 (2003), O'Connor declined to consider an issue raised in an amicus brief filed by the
State of Florida because it had not been raised in petitioner's brief.
92 See SuP. CT. R. 37.1.
93 See Breyer, supra note 30, at 26.
94 See, e.g., Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 497 (not considering issue raised by amicus brief
because it had not been raised in petitioner's brief).
95 See Id. (citing brief by State of Florida but declining to consider its argument);
Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 313-14 (1998) (citing brief of
various states but rejecting their argument); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney,
495 U.S. 299, 308 (1990) (citing brief of Council of State Governments for result
contrary to their argument); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 464 (1988)
(citing brief of State of North Dakota for legislative history; O'Connor agreed with their
position); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 93 (1987) (citing brief of State of Texas with
which she agreed).
96 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (citing brief of non-profit
humanitarian relief organization and associations of international journalists and agreeing
with their argument); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 125 n. 13 (2003)
(citing brief filed by business organizations and possibly considering their argument);
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998) (citing brief filed by
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Professional organizations may even find that their work is most likely to
be cited if they do not take a formal position in a case but, instead, submit an
amicus brief in the posture of a neutral friend of the court. For example, in
Maryland v. Craig,97 the American Psychological Association filed a brief in
support of neither side in which they discussed the trauma to children of
testifying under stressful conditions. During oral argument, the Maryland
Attorney General brought the amicus brief to the Court's attention, 98 and
O'Connor cited it in her opinion in favor of the State of Maryland.99
Although the brief was clearly in support of the State of Maryland's statute
protecting children from testifying, its arguments were packaged in neutral,
professional terms that may have made them more appealing to O'Connor.
This survey of citations of amicus briefs should give public interest
organizations pause in using their financial resources to file amicus briefs
under their own name, especially if their organization is affiliated with a
comparatively extreme political perspective. Briefs by public interest
organizations known for their advocacy of a particular political position
received no mention by O'Connor whatsoever.100 Although she authored
many opinions dealing with free speech issues on which the ACLU, for
various fine arts organizations for a factual point but not adopting its reasoning); Riggins
v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 137 (1992) (citing brief for the American Psychiatric
Association and agreeing with its conclusion); Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-22 (1991) (citing brief of the Association of
American Publishers and agreeing with its conclusion); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
855 (1990) (citing brief of the American Psychological Association and agreeing with its
conclusion); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335-39 (1989) (citing American
Association on Mental Retardation several times for specialized information about mental
retardation but disagreeing with its legal conclusion); Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v.
Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287 (1984) (citing brief filed by the American Association of
University Professors for a legal argument but then not accepting their view). Cf City of
Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 300 (2000) (citing brief authored by First Amendment
Lawyers for factual information but rejecting their conclusion); E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 535 (1998) (citing briefs by labor unions but not accepting their argument).
97 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
98 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *18-19, Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (No. 89-478),
1990 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 192.
99 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855, 857.
100 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (not citing briefs by ACLU
and AFL-CIO on privacy issue); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 486
(1989) (describing briefs on both sides as offering "rather stark alternatives" that could
not "withstand analysis"); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (not citing brief by
People Against Child Abuse); Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (199 1) (not citing brief filed by ACLU); Voinovich v. Quilter,
507 U.S. 146 (1993) (not citing brief filed by NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (not citing briefs filed
by ACLU and Planned Parenthood).
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example, had a strongly held position, she never cited a brief authored by the
ACLU.' 0 ' Thus, commentators who have suggested that well-respected
organizations like the ACLU or the NAACP LDF can expect to have their
briefs seriously considered by the Court can find little support for that view
in O'Connor's opinions.
4. Citations of Specialized Facts
Citation for specialized facts was by far the most frequent way in which
O'Connor used amicus briefs. 10 2 As discussed above, Justice Breyer has
approved of this use of amicus briefs in cases involving scientific or
technical information. 10 3 However, Judge Posner has questioned the
legitimacy of this use of amicus briefs in a recent law review article. 104
The evidence available from oral arguments also supports the specialized
facts theory of reliance on amicus briefs. For example, in Hodel v. Irving,105
the Court was presented with the question of the constitutionality of a federal
statute that barred inheritance of highly fractionated Indian land. O'Connor
cited the brief by one of the tribes for background on the operation of this
statute. 106 During the oral argument, there was discussion of how inheritance
operated with respect to the fractionated heirship problem. The appellee's
attorney referred to the briefs of the Yakima Nation and the Oglala Sioux
Tribe to help answer these questions. 10 7 Although O'Connor did not cite
either of those amicus briefs in her opinion for the Court, she did cite another
amicus brief by an Indian tribe, 10 8 signaling that such briefs may have been
101 Twenty-seven of the cases in the study involved First Amendment issues. See
Appendix A.
102 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984) (citing
Hawaiian organizations on both sides for specialized facts); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 712, 718 (1987) (citing brief of tribe for specialized facts but rejecting its legal
argument); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 163-64 (1989)
(citing brief by well respected litigant whom the Court had invited to participate in the
case for specialized facts); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 580 (1989) (citing
brief of Law & Humanities Institute in statement of facts).
103 See Breyer, supra note 30, at 26.
104 See Richard A. Posner, Foreword.: A Political Court, 119 HARv. L. REv. 31, 48
(2005) (criticizing citation of amicus briefs "to fill empirical gaps" because they are "not
subject to peer review or other processes for verification").
105 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
106 Id. at 712.
107 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *33-34, Hodel, 481 U.S. 704 (No. 85-637),
1986 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 12.
108 See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 712 (citing brief by Sisseston-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe).
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helpful in bringing specialized facts to the Court's attention. 109 She appears
to have been particularly interested in specialized facts in cases involving
historical land use issues, as she also cited an amicus brief in a case involving
Hawaiian land use history."10
The claim against the use of amicus briefs to develop specialized facts is
that the arguments may have not been subjected to sufficient cross-
examination."I ' O'Connor may have avoided that problem by using briefs
whose legal arguments she rejected to develop specialized facts. Proponents
of specialized facts may therefore need to be on notice that they may be most
likely to see their brief used to support a contrary position. 1
2
5. Citations of Briefs Signaling Something Other Than Influence
As Appendix A reflects, O'Connor was more likely to disagree than
agree with an amicus curiae cited in her opinion. This tendency was not
limited to citations to the Solicitor General, as discussed above. In seven
cases, she cited amicus curiae other than the Solicitor General but disagreed
with their legal positions. 113 In all but one of these cases, the amici she cited
109 During oral argument, the Court has discussed briefs for specialized facts in
other cases as well, even if those briefs did not get cited in the Court's opinion. See
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989) (Massachusetts Attorney General bringing
the Riceman Report, which was discussed in various amici briefs, to the Court's
attention. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *10, Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (No. 87-1651),
1989 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 137).
110 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
111 Judge Posner criticized the way O'Connor cites an amicus brief in her dissent in
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J. dissenting). See
Posner, supra note 104, at 96-97. He criticized her for citing a "single study" to justify
her position which, in his words, "she made no attempt to evaluate despite its being an
advocacy document of questionable objectivity." Id. at 96. The study she cited was
authored by the Institute for Justice, a conservative public interest finm. See id. at 96
n. 193. It is interesting to note that O'Connor cited a conservative organization's work in a
dissent to support a position that they advocated, although I found that she never cited
such organizations in her opinions for the Court. She may therefore have been more
cautious with such citations when writing an opinion for a majority of the Court than
when she authored a dissent for herself alone.
112 Whether other Justices similarly cite amicus briefs for specialized facts, but
reach contrary legal conclusions, is beyond the scope of this Article but warrants further
investigation.
113 See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287 (1984) (citing
and rejecting legal argument made by American Association of University Professors);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335-39 (1989) (citing specialized facts from the
American Association on Mental Retardation but disagreeing with its legal conclusion);
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 308 (1990) (citing brief for
Council of State Governments to support the opposite conclusion); Lunding v. N.Y. Tax
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were prestigious, mainstream organizations who she may have wanted to
respect through citation. In the one case where the amicus curiae was a labor
union, she generically referred to "amici" and did not specify that it was a
labor union. 114 Even though she disagreed with its position, she did not
appear to feel a sufficient need to demonstrate respect for a labor union by
naming it.
Rather than measuring influence, citations to amicus briefs might reflect
who a Justice wants to signal is her "friend." Even if O'Connor was
influenced by a brief authored by the ACLU, she did not appear to want to
signal to the outside world that the brief influenced her decision. Citations
may be an effort to control image, and the image chosen by O'Connor was
one of a moderate who would not be affiliated with briefs by either end of the
political spectrum. Because she often sought middle-ground, pragmatic
positions, the briefs by proponents of either side may have failed to persuade
her. Nonetheless, it is possible that O'Connor's citations genuinely reflected
substantive influence.
Public interest organizations, such as the ACLU, which frequently author
amicus briefs, might wonder if my findings suggest that they are wasting
their resources on such efforts. Despite O'Connor's failure to cite the ACLU,
I cannot conclude their efforts are wasted because they may have focused
their efforts primarily on developing legal theories which O'Connor was
unlikely to cite. Although arguments that are "far left" or "far right" were not
likely to be adopted by O'Connor, they could have helped frame the middle-
ground position that she ultimately adopted. The middle might appear to be
in a different place if both poles are not discussed in the briefing process.
Hence, it might be a risky strategy for public interest organizations not to
continue their political advocacy, even if those arguments are unlikely to be
cited by a moderate such as O'Connor.
The Grutter case appears to be fairly unique with respect to the degree of
influence of an amicus brief. Nonetheless, Grutter does share some elements
found in these other cases. First, O'Connor relied on a mainstream brief, not
a brief filed by a public interest organization known for its extreme views in
either ideological direction. Second, the brief offered specialized facts or
experiences that were relevant to the resolution of the case. Finally, it was
filed by a prestigious group of people-retired military officers.
Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 313-14 (1998) (citing brief by states but rejecting their
legal argument); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 535 (1998) (citing generally to amici
labor unions but not naming them; disagreeing with their position); Nat'l Endowment for
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998) (citing brief of fine arts organization for
facts but not adopting its legal position); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 300
(2000) (citing First Amendment Lawyers Association but disagreeing with facts asserted
through empirical study).
114 See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 535 (1998).
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III. CONCLUSION
Prior studies have examined the role of amicus briefs in Supreme Court
litigation primarily through quantitative tools. Those studies have been
valuable in giving the reader a sense of the scope of amicus filings and the
relationship between amicus participation and judicial decisions. Quantitative
assessments, however, could not capture how Justices rely on amicus briefs
in their opinions. Do the opinions themselves provide evidence that these
amicus briefs were influential? How are amicus briefs used-to advance
legal or factual arguments?
An examination of Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court in
constitutional law cases suggests that amicus briefs are most likely to be
cited if they offer specialized facts that support the majority's legal theory.
Citation, however, does not necessarily correlate with influence. O'Connor
was more likely to cite a brief when she disagreed with its legal conclusion
than when she agreed with it. In fact, in some instances she apparently cited a
brief for its specialized facts because she disagreed with its legal
conclusion."15 The citation to specialized facts could therefore constitute a
signal of respectful disagreement rather than influence.
Like quantitative tools, qualitative tools have their limitations. It may be
the nature of judicial decision-making that amicus briefs are only likely to be
cited in support of facts rather than legal arguments, because precedent is the
traditional way to establish legal principles. Further, the failure to cite
controversial organizations may be prudent for a Justice in political terms,
but may not reflect what arguments ultimately persuaded her to a particular
position.
Nonetheless, a qualitative investigation can help confirm some of the
theories on amicus briefs. In the case of Justice O'Connor, at least, it
confirms both the specialized facts and prestigious filer theories. Her citation
of amicus briefs is also consistent with the portrayal of O'Connor as
someone searching for middle-ground positions. Her citations to legal
arguments from amicus briefs were consistent with her middle-ground
approach. Extreme political arguments were not cited. If O'Connor is
reflective of the Court in general, then authors of amicus briefs who wish to
be cited by the Court might want to focus more of their attention on factual
development. They also might want to affiliate themselves with a neutral-
sounding professional organization.
115 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984) (citing briefs
on both sides for specialized facts); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712 (1987) (citing




Although O'Connor's middle-ground approach and avoidance of
affiliation with politically extreme groups may have served her well as a
Supreme Court Justice, it will be interesting to see if that path is useful for
future members of the Court. Such an approach may have harmed Harriet
Miers' consideration for the Supreme Court. Harriet Miers stated in 1989 that
she "tried to avoid memberships in organizations that were politically
charged with one viewpoint or the other.""16 She then went on to state that
she would not join the Federalist Society because "it's better to not be
involved in organizations that seem to color your view one way or the other
for people who are examining you.""17 Miers' lack of "friends," however,
appeared to harm her nomination to the Court. By contrast, the strong
support that Samuel Alito received from political conservatives may have
paved the way for his successful confirmation as an Associate Justice.
Politically influential friends may be necessary to a successful confirmation
even if, once appointed, a Justice needs to distance herself from those
friends. It will be interesting to monitor the use of amicus briefs by Alito to
see if he, too, seeks to avoid association with extreme political groups in his
opinions for the Court. Citations to amicus briefs can give us a sense of
evolving friendship patterns.
116 Richard W. Stevenson, White House Dismisses Idea of Withdrawal by Nominee,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2005, at A19.
117 Id.
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